Until recently, the method of professional ethics has been largely principle-based. But the failure of this approach to take into sufficient account the character of professionals has led to a revival of virtue ethics. The kind of professional virtue ethics that I am concerned with in this paper is teleological in that it relates the virtues of a profession to the ends of this profession. My aim is to show how empirical research can (in addition to philosophical inquiry) be used to develop virtue-based accounts of professional ethics, and that such empirically well-informed approaches are more convincing than traditional kinds of professional virtue ethics. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I outline the structure of a teleological approach to virtue ethics. In Section 2, I show that empirical research can play an essential role in professional ethics by emphasizing the difference between conceptual and empirical matters. Section 3 demonstrates the relevance of virtues in professional life; and the last section is concerned with some metaethical issues that are raised by a teleological account of professional virtues.
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There is, however, a great variety of virtue theories, which differ both in terms of their aims and how they define the virtues (see Swanton 2013 , for discussion). The most often employed approach to professional virtue ethics is the neo-Aristotelian type, according to which virtues are grounded in a purpose or end (telos). 2 In Aristotle's ethics, this is the end of human beings; and in a neo-Aristotelian version of professional ethics, it is the end of a profession. That is to say, the kind of professional ethics that I am concerned with in this paper is teleological (but not consequentialist) in that it relates the virtues of a profession to the end of this profession. It is this end which gives content to professional virtues and on the basis of which they will be justified. That is, on such an account, professional virtues are essentially end-directed or teleological.
Some theories of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics are rival accounts to principle-based ethical theories, holding that virtue ethics should replace other theories of normative ethics (in particular, consequentialist and deontological theories). But on the present account, virtues are only a supplementary component of a comprehensive theory of professional ethics, 3 which would also include a theory of right action. 4 That is, in this paper I do not aim to provide a complete picture of professional ethics.
As already noted, Aristotelian accounts of professional ethics have also been
proposed by other authors. But these writers rely almost exclusively on their personal opinion and on everyday observations when they make claims about professional virtues (e.g., that virtues determine action or that they can be taught). Social scientists have repeatedly critiqued this method. They rightly hold that ethicists ought to place more emphasis on scientific evidence, and argue that by not taking empirical research seriously, ethics has lost much of its relevance (e.g., Hedgecoe 2004) .
Against this background, the aim of this article is now simple to state. My main purpose is to show how empirical research can (in addition to philosophical inquiry) be used to develop virtue-based accounts of professional ethics, and that such empirically well-informed approaches are more convincing than traditional kinds of professional virtue ethics. In order to achieve this, the paper is organized as follows: In the first section, I outline the structure of a teleological approach to virtue ethics. In Section 2, I
demonstrate that empirical research can play a vital role in professional ethics by emphasizing the difference between conceptual and empirical matters. The third section shows the relevance of virtues in professional life, and the last section is concerned with some metaethical issues that are raised by a teleological account of virtue ethics. conception that underlies a virtue theory).
The structure of a virtue-based ethics
As I have already mentioned, on the Aristotelian conception of ethics, virtues are needed to achieve our purpose as human beings (i.e., to live a flourishing life). By applying this conception to the realm of professional ethics, we get a teleological framework for a virtue-based account of professional ethics. On this account, professional virtues are grounded on the end of a profession. Just as Aristotle's virtues are derived from an (assumed) end of human beings, so are professional virtues those character traits which a professional needs for serving the end of his profession. (I will often omit the qualifier "professional" for the sake of brevity.) Calmness is arguably a virtue of airline pilots because it is needed when dealing with challenging weather conditions (being panicky would be a vice), and compassion is a virtue of doctors if this trait is needed to serve the goal of the medical profession well.
It is obvious that an adequate teleological theory of virtues must provide a defensible account of the goals specific to a profession. Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) have sketched such an account for medicine. They hold that the medical profession has a variety of ends including the restoration or improvement of physical and mental health; Oakley and Cocking (2001, 75) regard achieving justice as the central goal of lawyering; Banks and Gallagher (2009) for serving the (current) goals of a profession; and the evidence for this can be provided by empirical research.
The conceptual and the empirical
Virtue ethical accounts that take scientific research seriously must clearly distinguish between conceptual and empirical issues. In general, conceptual questions are prior to matters of fact; and any empirical inquiry about virtues and their effects that proceeds from a confused conceptual background is likely to be misdirected and will not yield satisfactory results. When we want to know whether humility is a virtue we must keep separate the conceptual questions 'What is a virtue?' and 'What is humility?' from the empirical question whether humility is a virtue. This empirical question can only be answered after we have answered the conceptual questions. Ethicists commonly confound conceptual and empirical issues. Let a simple example suffice to illustrate this. Beauchamp and Childress (2009, 38) hold that the virtue of compassion involves a regard for another's welfare (which is a conceptual claim about compassion and presupposes that compassion is a virtue), and they state that physicians who do not express compassion often fail to provide what patients most need (which is an empirical claim). But they neither provide definitions of the concepts involved, nor do they back up their empirical claim with real facts and data. And this is not an isolated case or exception. Authors frequently make claims about virtues that do not adequately represent contemporary scientific research but rather reflect the researchers' personal views and opinions (see, e.g., Driver 2001; Pellegrino 2002) . 7 While I hold that virtue ethics should be based on current scientific research (mainly personality psychology), I don't want to give the impression that I regard the knowledge of experienced professionals as irrelevant. On the contrary, the views of experienced teachers can provide valuable information about qualities of good teachers. But they should be tested in scientific studies because they may be biased. The point of this section is to provide clear definitions of key concepts and to show how scientific research can be used to improve the quality of virtue theories.
1. Let me begin with a clarification of the concept professional virtue, which is obviously central to any virtue-based theory of professional ethics. As already mentioned, on the account presented here, professional virtues are traits of character (or personality)
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that help a professional to serve a profession's purpose(s) well. We can put this succinctly by defining virtues as follows:
D1:
A trait is a professional virtue if and only if a professional needs it (to at least some minimal degree) to serve the end(s) of the profession well.
A few words of explanation about some requirements of this definition will be helpful. By saying that a trait is needed, I do not mean that it is a necessary condition (in the strict sense of the term) for serving a profession well. I hold the weaker view that virtues are favourably relevant to the attainment of a profession's ends by making it more likely that a professional serves these ends well. The phrase, 'to at least some minimal degree' has been included because having a virtue is a matter of degree, and a trait like integrity can be a virtue even if a professional does not exemplify it to its fullest extent.
The definition is a precising definition. That is, it is intended to make a vague everyday notion more exact without assigning it a completely new meaning. The definition has the logical form of a so-called biconditional (or equivalence), which is important for deriving several corollaries (see below).
That virtues are needed to serve the end of a profession is true by definition. There is no need for empirical research to confirm this. But the definition does not allow us to determine whether a certain trait is a virtue. For example, if we want to know whether meticulousness is a virtue of musicians, we first need to clarify the concept meticulousness and then find out whether this trait is needed to serve the musical profession well. This will require some sort of scientific research if we want to avoid subjectivity. That is, a satisfying answer to the question whether a trait is a virtue requires a combination of the conceptual and the empirical.
2. Let me turn now to the concept of a good professional. It is related to the notion of professional virtues because these virtues are characteristic features of good professionals. They enable a professional to be good qua professional. Good professionals possess and exercise professional virtues. We speak of a good lawyer, teacher, or engineer, and what we mean by this is that they are good at their respective profession. A good general is good as a general (but not necessarily as a human being).
He is good at those activities, the skilful performance of which constitutes the excellence of generals (von Wright 1963, 33 3. I will now briefly discuss the notion of a bad professional because it is not immediately clear how to define it. One might suggest that, say, a bad nurse is one that poorly serves the ends of the nursing profession, which is to hold that the notions of good and bad professionals are related to one another as contraries. But this seems to be a mistake. Following von Wright (1963) , we should rather say that to be a bad professional is to suffer a privation. The bad nurse is one that is not good at nursing. That is to say that the concepts of good and bad professionals are contradictorily, and not contrarily, opposed to one another. We can therefore define this notion as follows:
D3:
A person is a bad professional if and only if he or she does not serve the end(s) of a profession well.
The bad (or poor) professional is the not-good professional, and conversely. A bad teacher does not teach the students well (but need not spoil them) and a bad doctor does not serve his patients' interests (which does not imply that he worsens their ailments). It goes without saying that the empirical issues here are analogous to those mentioned in the previous paragraph. That an irritable person will be a poor teacher may seem This corollary (i.e., immediate consequence) can be derived from Definition 1, together with the thesis that if a trait is needed to serve the end of a profession well then it is also needed for being a good professional (where 'needed' again means being favourably relevant). I think this thesis is quite plausible. Since the good professional has been defined as a person who serves the ends of a profession well, any trait that is needed for this will also be needed by a good professional. By using this thesis, the derivation of (C1) becomes straightforward: The two premises (1) 'A trait is a professional virtue if and only if a professional needs it (to at least some minimal degree) to serve the end(s) of the profession well' (D1); and (2) 'If a trait is needed to serve the end of a profession well then it is also needed for being a good professional' (thesis) entail C1, as anyone familiar with elementary logic can prove.
Even though this corollary has been established by means of logic, empirical research about it can lead to interesting results. This is so because if the conclusion of a valid argument is false then at least one of its premises must be false, too. That is to say, if empirical research shows that some professional virtues are not needed for being a good professional then (D1) or our thesis (or both) are not tenable. Scientists have sometimes claimed that empirical research should be used to test normative and conceptual claims (see Hedgecoe 2004) . I have given here a simple example of how this can be done in a logically correct way. 8 Virtue ethicists make numerous claims about virtues that are not conceptual truths (i.e., they are not derivable from the definition of virtue), but empirical statements. In the remainder of this section, I will briefly discuss some of them and argue that ethicists will do better if they base such claims on scientific research.
Ethicists frequently hold that virtues have motivational force (see Hursthouse
1999; Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993; 1996) , and some make quite specific claims about motivational effects of virtues. For example, Annas (2015) holds that virtuous persons are motivationally unconflicted, i.e., they need not overcome reluctance. The virtuous person will do the virtuous thing "without internal struggle" (p. 96). It is obvious that such claims are empirical in nature and need to be backed up by evidence. There has been considerable scientific research effort towards the investigation of motivational effects of personality traits. But in which way, if any, traits cause or influence behaviour is still controversially discussed in personality psychology (see Matthews and Deary 1998 to pay more attention to the plight of others. Even though current psychology cannot verify this far-reaching hypothesis, there is at least some research that seems to support it (Matthews and Deary 1998, 73) .
To summarize, virtue ethics involves many conceptual and empirical issues. It is therefore important that ethicists clarify the concepts they employ and take empirical research seriously when they construct virtue theories.
The relevance of virtues in professional life
Much of recent work in virtue ethics, including virtue-based professional ethics, suffers from a lack of detail about how this ethical approach can be applied to issues of professional life. In this section, I briefly discuss the relevance of virtues to professional education, personnel recruitment and selection, and performance appraisal. make the yet stronger claim that virtues relevant to nursing should be a requirement for admission of candidates to schools of nursing (Catlett and Lovan 2011) . The main reason for this is that patients' dissatisfaction with nursing care has been shown to be partly due to nurses' poor traits of character (Chen and Hsu 2015) , and it is hoped that character formation will improve the situation. Similarly, it has been recommended that teaching 
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Some think that virtues can be taught and learned like skills (e.g., playing the piano), which is a view similar to Aristotle's position (Annas 2011) . Others seem to be confident that virtues can be taught in courses in practical ethics (see Harris 2008; Pellegrino 2002) .
It is clear that we are here once more faced with an empirical issue. The scientific literature on the acquisition of character traits suggests that both genetics and the environment contribute to traits. This implies that character traits have at least some biological basis (see Matthews and Deary 1998) . In which way (if any) virtues can be taught is an issue which philosophers can and should leave to the educationists.
2. Since virtues seem essential to proper conduct of professionals, it has been suggested that they are used for selecting applicants to particular occupations. For example, most people would be reluctant to fly in an aeroplane that is piloted by a person with abnormally high sensation-seeking (a disposition to pursue excitement, take risks and seek thrills) and, in fact, some airlines use already tests to screen out would-be pilots who have traits considered to be inappropriate to airline pilots (see Matthews and Deary 1998) . Some researchers are sceptical about the use of such tests, holding that they have large margins of error and are too easily psyched out (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993) .
But research suggests that traits (e.g., conscientiousness) are relevant to decisions about personnel recruitment (see Salgado 1997) . Personality measures are, therefore, now used in various professions, including medicine (see DeRosa 2006) and business sector organisations (e.g., integrity tests for predicting employee theft).
3. There is also a relationship between personality and general occupational performance. Evidence suggests that traits are correlated to performance criteria, and personality questionnaires are now widely used to assess job performance (see Kanfer et al. 1995) . For example, in their comprehensive meta-analysis on integrity tests, Ones et al. (1993) have shown that such questionnaires "are substantial for predicting job performance and counterproductive behaviors on the job, such as theft, disciplinary problems, and absenteeism" (p. 679). That character traits are correlated to job performance is also suggested by the meta-analysis of Hurtz and Donovan (2000) , who
focussed on conscientiousness and found that it has a strong relation to overall job performance.
The research presented in this section indicates that professional virtues are not only an interesting subject for academic researchers, but have important applications to practical issues in professional life, too.
Some metaethical reflections on professional virtues
Virtue ethical theories raise numerous metaethical issuese.g., whether virtues are necessarily evaluative traits or whether they can be used for justifying our actions. This section is concerned with the main metaethical questions that are raised by teleological accounts of professional ethics. is a means to something that is good, it is extrinsically goodmore specifically, it is then said to be instrumentally good.
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Theorists frequently claim that virtues are intrinsically good (Annas 2011; Swanton 2003) . This is, however, a controversial view because it entails that a trait like courage would be valuable even if it had no effects on its possessor's behaviour and even if it consistently led to immoral conduct. On the account presented in this paper, virtues have instrumental value (or disvalue). Let me explain. In professional ethics, it is generally assumed that the ends of a profession are good. Researchers hold that professions provide benefits to a society (e.g., health is provided by the medical profession and growth of the personality of students by the teaching profession). As we have seen, professional virtues are needed to serve these good ends. They are means by which professionals can attain the ends of their profession; and from this it follows that the value of these virtues is instrumental. 10 In other words, the value of virtues is derivative, it stems from the good ends to which they are means.
I should mention here, however, that on a teleological conception, virtues are not necessarily good traits. If the ends are bad, the means to these ends are instrumentally bad. It is easily conceivable that someone regards the end of a profession as bad, in which case he will also regard the "virtues" of this profession as bad. For example, obedience to superiors is a quintessential virtue of military professionals. From the viewpoint of a pacifist, the ends of the military profession may be bad, which may render obedience to superiors an instrumental evil. To sum, when we state that a person has a professional virtue (or vice), we may only make a descriptive statement. But on most occasions we do both, we make a factual statement and express a value judgement. That is to say, we make hybrid statements.
Appreciating this fact about evaluative language is important to understand virtue-based reasoning, to which I turn now.
4. Virtue ethicists commonly claim that virtues provide reasons for action (even though they do not always distinguish between motivating and justifying reasons, see Hursthouse 1999) . On this view, we can argue 'I should return the money because this is the honest thing to do', where 'this is the honest thing to do' provides a justification for returning the money. Such virtue-based reasoning is, however, more complex than it may appear at first sight. In what follows, I will briefly explain when it is logically correct and when it is fallacious.
Let us start with a simple example. A professional may argue: 'I should support my organization's interests because this is required by loyalty'. In this example, the sentence 'I should support my organization's interests' is the normative conclusion, which has been justified by reference to the virtue of loyalty. Such an inferential justification is, however, only possible if loyalty is a hybrid (and therefore evaluative) concept. To explain why this is so, I must say a few words about the so-called is-ought problem.
According to a widely accepted view, called Hume's Law after the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, normative conclusions can only be validly inferred if at least one of the premises is normative or evaluative. According to Hume's Law, we are making a serious logical mistake it we try to infer normative conclusions from only descriptive premises. Hume's thesis asserts that no number of stated facts logically entail what we should do. Returning to our example, the normative conclusion 'I should support my organization's interests' can therefore only be justified if 'this is required by loyalty' is an evaluative statement, which is only the case if loyalty is a hybrid concept.
As I have mentioned above, virtue concepts can be purely descriptive. If loyalty is a descriptive concept the sentence 'Loyalty requires supporting one's organization' expresses a purely descriptive statement, which cannot be used to justify the normative claim that I should support my organization's interests. The reason for this is the logical gap between the descriptive and the evaluative, on which Hume's Law is based.
SPIELTHENNER, G. Virtue-Based Approaches to Professional Ethics
To sum up this brief discussion of a complex issue, virtue-based reasoning to a normative conclusion is only logically correct if the virtues that have been invoked in order to establish the conclusion are hybrid concepts because this implies that at least one of the premises used as reasons for the conclusion is an evaluative statement.
The result of this investigation may be summarized as follows. Virtues have a genuine role to play in professional ethics because virtue ethical accounts can supplement the use of ethical principles, which is still predominant in this branch of practical ethics.
A teleological approach to a virtue-based ethics seems to offer the most promising way of dealing with professional virtues. It can be based on empirical evidence; and by relying on scientific research, it ensures that professional virtues are investigated in a nonarbitrary way, which guarantees more objectivity in ethical research.
